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The Scientific Face of Beauvoir  
Without a doubt, the single most powerful (and illustrious) element of 
Simone de Beauvoir’s magnum opus, The Second Sex (1949), is her radical 
declaration that biological processes do not make a “woman.” Social 
relations do. Perhaps more so than any other claim found in any her works, 
this claim helped Beauvoir bulldoze over the mythos of gender essentialism 
that has saturated Western philosophy since the days of Socrates, Plato, and 
Aristotle. Indeed, according to some, this claim turned The Second Sex into 
the “feminist bible” of the twentieth century. Of course, various other 
thinkers—living both before and after Beauvoir—have made comparable 
claims about the relationship between biology and gender, usually from the 
standpoint of value theory. But what makes Beauvoir’s intervention 
philosophically unique is that her claim about the social construction of sex 
and gender appears in an specifically “epistemological” and “scientific” 
context: the first chapter of The Second Sex, “Biological Data” [Les Données de 
la Biologie], where Beauvoir lays out a meticulous and judicious analysis of 
the leading biological theories of her time, from evolutionary theory to 
genetics to physiology. Her groundbreaking assertion that biology is not the 
overseer of women’s lives or the deputy of women’s fate is forged in the 
crucible of what is arguably her most poignant and most direct engagement 
with the natural sciences.  
Unfortunately, while the significance of Beauvoir’s thought for social, 
political, and ethical philosophy has been the subject of extensive discussion 
in the revelant literature, its import for the philosophy of science has gone 
virtually unheeded. As of 2016, for instance, there exist no book-length 
manuscripts on Beauvoir’s relationship to the science of biology (or, for that 
matter, to “science” as such), and one has to probe the ground quite 
painstakingly just to find the handful of book chapters and journal articles 
that deal with this aspect of her work.1  
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Granted, Beauvoir never wrote a treatise on the logic of scientific 
inquiry à la Popper, a text on the nature of scientific history à la Kuhn, or an 
essay on the nature of scientific explanation à la Hempel. So it should not 
surprise us if her name does not regularly appear in mainstream philosophy 
of science journals or even, as Anna Mudde points out, in recent debates in 
the field of feminist science studies.2 After all, from a somewhat early age, as 
we learn in Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter (1958), Beauvoir was closer to the 
Balzacs, Prousts, and Collettes of the world than she would ever be to its 
Darwins, Einsteins, or Freges—her allegiances having been decided as early 
as her teenage years in favor of three eidolons: “art, philosophy, and 
literature.”3  
Still, we know from the primary and secondary literatures that 
throughout her life Beauvoir viewed science and its problems as objects of 
intense philosophical curiosity and as topics worthy of serious intellectual 
engagement. We know from her memoirs that she was reared in the 
empirical and formal sciences from the time she was a young girl, and that 
she graduated from the Sorbonne with a teaching certificate in 
mathematics.4 We also know that she appeals to scientific theorems and 
scientific epistemology at virtually every stage of her career, from her 1924 
student essay “Analysis of Claude Bernard’s Introduction to the Study of 
Experimental Medicine” to her 1944 essay “Pyrrhus and Cineas” to her 1945 
review of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception to her 
subsequent one of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s The Elementary Structures of Kinship 
in 1949.5 Even more notably, we know that the question concerning the 
status and value of scientific knowledge lies at the heart of her “two 
extended philosophical treatises”6: The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second 
Sex. Why, then, have the ethical and political stakes of the Beauvoirian 
philosophy overshadowed its scientific and epistemological ones? Why have 
Beauvoir’s numerous remarks about the sciences, both in works leading up 
to the publication of The Second Sex but also in works following it, been so 
frequently tossed aside by readers as inconsequential, unmotivated, and 
even aberrant slip-ups of thought? Why, in other words, do we know so 
little about her views concerning the nature, structure, and limits of scientific 
knowledge?  
Although it would be hard to pinpoint any one cause responsible for 
this state of affairs, I suspect that certain habits of philosophical practice—
that is to say, certain habits of thinking, reading, interpreting, and writing—
may be to blame, at least in part. It is not uncommon for us (us, academics) 
to approach our objects of study with certain preconceptions about what 
those objects are, can be, or should be. Sometimes, of course, these 
preconceptions are fairly harmless and get confirmed by further study. But 
sometimes they are not. Sometimes, they are dangerous and self-fulfilling 
prophecies that prevent us from letting ourselves be surprised by the 
dynamic, polyphonic, and multidimensional nature of the very objects we 
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study.7 In the case of Beauvoir, I argue, there are at least two habits that have 
contributed to the near-total lack of research on her relationship to the 
sciences in general and biology in particular: first, what Margaret Simons 
and Hélène Peters call “the popular conception of existentialism as anti-
science”8; and second, a certain way of reading The Second Sex that glosses 
over the details of its critical point of departure.9 As “cognitive filters,” these 
habits fill our perceptual field with all sorts of blind spots that shape not 
only what we see but also what we are in a position to see. They make it easier 
for us to see in Beauvoir’s writitings the traces of some intellectual pedigrees 
(ethical theory, political philosophy, phenomenology, feminism, 
existentialism) at the expense of others (epistemology, metaphysics, 
philosophy of science). At best, they simply mold our understanding of 
what Barbara Andrew calls Beauvoir’s “place in philosophical thought.”10 At 
worst, they render implausible, if not unthinkable, the possibility that 
Beauvoir’s work may reflect a nuanced understanding of the history, 
philosophy, and epistemology of the life sciences, thereby muting any 
resonances between her work and that of contemporary philosophers of 
science and philosophers of biology.11 
But the fact itself that scientific themes, polemics, and controversies 
recur in Beauvoir’s oeuvre is good evidence that many of the questions 
typically raised by “orthodox” philosophers of science and biology—
including questions concerning the anatomy of scientific knowledge, the 
logic of the empirical method, and the relationship between science and 
society—lie at the heart of her unique brand of existentialism and perhaps 
even ground her self-understanding as a social critic. This fact is also an 
irrefutable sign of the explicitly epistemological ambitions of her feminist 
project, which the present article intends to bring to the fore.   
The article is organized as follows. Firstly, I zoom in on Beauvoir’s 
reading of biology in the first chapter of The Second Sex and illuminate key 
aspects of her argument by rationally reconstructing it.12 The goal of this 
reconstruction is to clarify Beauvoir’s position relative to the science of life 
and to highlight the places where she merges biology and philosophy in 
philosophically interesting ways. Secondly, once this reconstructive labor is 
complete I show that there is a strong affinity between Beauvoir’s overall 
approach to biology and the philosophical method of “immanent critique.” 
In making this affinity explicit, I bring attention to the originality of 
Beauvoir’s thought while contesting the notion that her criticism of biology 
betrays a pernicious anti-scientism characteristic of existentialist philosophy 
more generally. Finally, I argue that paying closer attention to the “scientific 
face” of Beauvoir’s philosophy can be advantageous for science, feminism, 
and existentialism alike.13 
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Beauvoir’s Reading of Biology: A Four-Point Reconstruction  
Beauvoir considered The Second Sex a “scientific work,”14 and there are two 
places in it where she makes direct contact with empirical science: chapter I, 
“Biological Data,” where she examines various theories and discoveries 
from evolutionary theory, genetics, developmental biology, and physiology; 
and chapter IV, “The Nomads,” where she explores anthropological 
accounts of gender. Both chapters betray a sophisticated understanding of 
the epistemic authority and social cache of scientific knowledge. They also 
reflect a distinctive philosophical methodology. Using the chapter on 
biology as a case study, I show that Beauvoir is not an anti-scientific 
reactionary who condemns science as a raw expression of economic, 
political, or social ideology (as some tributaries of orthodox Marxism do). 
For her, the main problem with various biological accounts of sexual 
difference is not that they are scientific per se, but rather that they are not 
scientific enough. Beauvoir, I claim, is a shrewd critic of science who 
challenges the ideological content of what Imre Lakatos calls “scientific 
research programs”15 by holding them accountable to norms of validity and 
rationality that are not superimposed upon science but extracted from 
science’s own conceptual scaffolding. To substantiate this claim, I offer a 
rational reconstruction of Beauvoir’s argument in “Biological Data” that, 
despite being chiefly descriptive in nature, should nevertheless help us 
identify her targets, methods, and objectives and thus better understand 
how she “works through” (as Freud might say) the philosophical 
implications of the biology of her time.  
In its reconstructed form, her argument in this chapter unfolds in four 
“moments” or “stages”: 
- the argument against naturalistic and ontological justifications of 
sexual differentiation,  
- the argument from the concrete reality of sexual differentiation,  
- the argument from the philosophy of life, and  
- the argument against physiology.  
Individually, each of these stages highlights different features of Beauvoir’s 
thinking about the science of life in The Second Sex. Together, they clarify the 
epistemological stakes of her venture and underscore its proximity to the 
philosophy of science. 
 
First Stage: The Rejection of the “Natural Law” and 
“Ontological” Arguments  
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Beauvoir’s target in “Biological Data” is the thesis of “sexual differentiation” 
according to which there is an absolute distinction between the sexes that is 
legislated into existence by the force of nature, being, or existence (and is, 
therefore, “necessary”). In reality, however, there are two different versions 
of this thesis: 
THE NATURAL LAW VERSION. In this version, sexual 
differentiation is a universal law of nature that applies without 
exception to the entire animal kingdom (homo sapiens included). And,  
THE ONTOLOGICAL A PRIORI VERSION. Here, sexual 
differentiation figures not as a law of nature per se, but as a necessary 
condition for the possibility of human existence. As such, it can be 
ascertained only vis-à-vis the kind of logico-transcendental 
investigation characteristic of post-Kantian metaphysical philosophy. 
Beauvoir responds to the natural law version with a straightforward 
empirical refutation. Sexual differentiation cannot be a universal principle of 
nature because it does not happen universally in the natural world. There 
are countless species that reproduce asexually, as well as species that have 
more than two sexes. These prove that sexual differentiation is, at best, a 
“contingent fact [of nature]” for which no proof can be given.16 She also 
argues that it would be impossible to try to explain the “necessity” of sexual 
differentiation by reducing it to some metaphysical principle that would 
“explain” it, such as a natural entelechy or a natural hierarchy.17 In 
contemporary biology, “finalism” and “hierarchism” are obsolete 
metaphysical concepts. Using either to explain the necessity of sexual 
differentiation would only violate the most basic norms of empirical 
procedure and desecrate the spirit of rational investigation upon which the 
modern scientific enterprise is based. 
Against a long history of metaphysics that extends from Plato to Hegel 
and that regards sexual differentiation as somehow written into the very 
logic of being or existence, Beauvoir also argues that there can be no 
“ontological proof” of sexual differentiation as that there are very few 
ontological truths that follow from the concept of “being” or “existence,” 
and sexual differentiation is not one of them. Drawing upon Merleau-
Ponty’s work in The Phenomenology of Perception,18 she notes that only two 
ontological truths follow from the fact of human existence: first that I 
necessarily have a body that is both subject and object of perception; and 
second that my body is structurally underdetermined by the requirements of 
perception, meaning that my body “need not possess this or that structure” in 
order for it to fulfill its function as the epicenter of perception.19 Nothing in 
the logic of being or in that of existence demands that my body be sexed in 
any specific way or even that it be sexed at all. 
Now, just as we cannot defend the natural law version from the 
empirical refutation by reducing sexual differentiation to some more 
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fundamental metaphysical principle (be it an entelechy or a hierarchy), we 
cannot save the ontological version by reducing sexual differentiation to 
some other, primitive, ontological structure that explains it. Consider the 
following hypothetical ontological proof, which Beauvoir introduces and 
rejects in “Biological Data,” and which I here present in summary form to 
clarify this point. 
HYPOTHETICAL PROOF: SEX DIFFERENTIATION AS THE 
NECESSARY, MATERIAL CONDITION FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF 
HUMAN TEMPORALITY.  
In Being and Nothingness (1943), in the midst of a polemic against 
Heidegger’s philosophy of finitude, Sartre alleges that “a temporally 
limitless existence is conceivable.” For Sartre, we can conceive of a kind 
of existence without finitude, which Heidegger’s ontological project 
ardently rejects. What this limitless existence is or looks like, however, 
Sartre does not say. But in The Second Sex Beauvoir claims that someone 
could use this Sartrean insight to construct an “ontological proof” for the 
theorem of sexual differentiation. This proof would go like this: first, the 
only “temporal infinity” we can truly conceive in relation to humans is 
the infinite existence of the human species (since individual humans are 
necessarily mortal); second, the infinity of the species would necessarily 
require “the perpetuation of the species” (since without perpetuation, 
the species could not exist in perpetuity); perpetuation in the human 
case is materially achieved vis-à-vis reproduction, which in turn requires 
the existence of two sexes; therefore, sexual differentiation is a necessary 
part of the ontological structure of human temporality.20 
No philosopher (at least no philosopher I know of) has defended this 
particular line of reasoning, and Beauvoir does not imply otherwise. But she 
uses this scenario to show that even this hypothetical, Sartrean “proof” of 
sexual differentiation would not work. The most this line of reasoning can 
prove is that the perpetuation of the species is an essential part “of the 
concrete definition of existence.” But what it cannot prove is precisely what 
it aims to prove—namely, that this perpetuation must be achieved by means 
of sexual reproduction. Beauvoir grants that perpetuation might entail 
reproduction. But reproduction, she says, “does not entail sexual 
differentiation.” Hence, just as Sartre can imagine a “temporally limitless 
existence” in Being and Nothingness so, too, we can imagine a temporally 
limitless existence that does not involve of sexual differentiation. All we 
have to do is “imagine a parthenogenetic […] society,”21i.e., a society that 
reproduces but not by sexual means.22  
When it comes to sexual differentiation, Beauvoir concludes, “we find 
ourselves before a fact that has neither ontological nor empirical basis and 
whose impact cannot a priori be understood.”23 As a fact of nature, sexual 
differentiation is both “contingent” and “irreducible.” If we want to clarify 
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its significance, we must leave behind the higher flights of nomology, 
metaphysics, and ontology and turn instead to this phenomenon’s “concrete 
reality.”24 This ushers in the second phase of Beauvoir’s argument.  
 
Second Stage: The Argument from the Concrete Reality of 
Sexual Differentiation  
In the second stage of her argument, Beauvoir takes up the suggestion that 
only an inquiry into the concrete reality of sexual differentiation should 
direct our biological and philosophical theories of sex and sexuality, and she 
argues that if we look at this reality with a sober and analytical eye—which 
is to say, without the distorting effects of patriarchal expectations—we come 
to realize that this natural fact does not mean what, often, professional 
biologists think it means. That at some point in its evolutionary history a 
species split into two sexes, for example, means neither that one sex outvies 
the other nor that we can make any inferences about the “sexed status” of 
any particular member of the species. From the fact that sexual 
differentiation exists, relatively little follows.  
For example, sexual differentiation—understood as “gamete 
specification,” i.e., as the evolution of two distinct gametes whose 
partnership is necessary to achieve the reproductive function—entails no 
value- or activity-differentials between the gametes since relative to the act 
of reproduction itself “neither gamete takes precedence [over the other].”25 
Unfortunately, biologists often describe reproduction and construct 
biological hypotheses in ways that imply the supremacy of one gamete. The 
reason is that biology has for a long time been under the sway of an 
ideological prejudice whose roots can be traced all the way back to 
Aristotle’s form/matter distinction: the patriarchal assumption that the 
maternal element is a fundamentally passive and almost immobile container 
(the ovum as “a nocturnal heaviness”), while the paternal element is a 
fundamentally active principle that initiates, forms, and achieves (the semen 
as an agent that “embodies the impatience and worry of existence [itself]”).26 
This assumption often sneaks into the research process as a hidden premise 
and affords a false sense of validity to judgments that assume or defend 
differentials in value or potentiality between the gametes (and, by extension, 
between the sexes).27  
But this prejudice, Beauvoir says, is empirically false. She writes: 
It is false to claim that the egg voraciously appropriates the female 
cell’s reserves because in the act that merges them, their 
individuality disappears […] besides the details of the 
psychochemical interactions leading to fertilization are not known. 
It is possible, however, to come away with a valuable indication of 
this meeting. There are two movements that come together in life, 
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and life maintains itself only by surpassing itself […] The 
conclusion is thus that fundamentally the role of the two gametes is 
identical; together they create a living being in which both of them 
lose and surpass themselves.28 
With this claim, Beauvoir problematizes both the common equivocation of 
maleness with activity, and the assumption that it is always the passive 
female that carries the (almost moralistic) onus of ensuring the reproduction 
of the species. All we know with certaining about the logic of reproduction, 
she says, is that there are two movements that together “create a living 
being”: the movement of the ovum and the movement of the sperm. 
Anything beyond that is either an ideological projection rooted in 
patriarchal principles or a simple confusion about the present state of 
biological knowledge.  
In addition to telling us nothing about the axiological or even functional 
importance of each gamete, sex differentiation tells us nothing about the 
features of particular organisms because gamete specification does not 
necessarily entail organismic specification along gametic lines. Even if we 
know that the germline of a species has split in two over the course of 
phyletic time, we still cannot infer anything from this about any one 
particular member of this species. We cannot predict, for instance, which 
members will belong to which gametic groups. We cannot even infer that all 
members must by necessity belong to one and only one of the two groups. 
After all, even in species marked by sex differentiation in the form of 
gametic specification there are particular organisms that flout binarism. 
Some animals, such as Bonellia viridis (the green spoonworm), begin their life 
cycle as asexual only to later develop a determinate sexed identity, meaning 
that they effectively belong to multiple sex-identities over the course of their 
life. Meanwhile, others, such as some species of toads, are endowed with 
what Beauvoir calls “sexual bipotentiality,” meaning that they “possess 
characteristics of the complementary sex.”29 “Even in species where sexual 
division is the most clear cut,” Beauvoir says with homo sapiens in mind, 
“there are individuals that are male and female simultaneously.”30 Her 
analysis of hermaphroditism appears precisely at this junction of her work.31 
The gap between gametic and organismic specification reveals the 
plasticity of the sex categories, which is also confirmed by laboratory 
experiments on grafting and castration that demonstrate that the process of 
sex determination can be experimentally and environmentally derailed. This 
gap also reminds us that we cannot jump from explanations couched in 
terms of gonad-properties to explanations couched in terms organism-
properties (as many professional biologists do) because the relation between 
the two is highly variable and complex, and because these two sets of 
properties may not map onto one another in a neat, one-to-one fashion.32 
From a strictly evolutionary perspective, as Sigmund Freud claims in Beyond 
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the Pleasure Principle (1920), the germ-lines “separate themselves from the 
organism as a whole [and] acquire a separate existence.”33 
 
Third Stage: The Argument from the Philosophy of Life 
At this point in her argument, Beauvoir leaves behind what up until now 
has been an almost exclusively negative outlook (her criticism of sexual 
binarism) in order to take up the more positive task of elaborating a theory 
or philosophy of life. This movement, which brings Beauvoir’s prose 
surprisingly close to eighteenth century natural history and nineteenth 
century Lebensphilosophie, is a crucial piece of the puzzle of her engagement 
with biology. In fact, this movement toward a grandiose (almost catholic) 
philosophy of life plays a central role in her demand that existential 
phenomenology take more seriously women’s experience of embodiment, 
which is shaped in important ways by women’s position (as Beauvoir sees 
it) as the least individualized and least free members of the most 
individualized and most free species.34  
The animal kingdom, Beauvoir says, is not an amorphous collection of 
organisms of varying morphological, genetic, and phenotypic forms. On the 
contrary, it is a taxonomic order with a certain “logic” that, when viewed as 
a whole, forms an internally coherent totality. Because of this logic, the 
kingdom animalia is structured in such a way that each animal, from the 
termite to the human, occupies a precise and fixed place in it. Now, typical 
post-Darwinian classifications of animals arrange living organisms 
according to a specific “logic”: the logic of common descent. But Beauvoir’s 
classification breaks this mold. In a radical departure from classical 
cladistics, she classifies animals according to an entirely different “logic” 
rooted in three organizing principles: 
1. THE PRINCIPLE OF MOUNTING INDIVIDUALITY. This principle 
holds that as we move from the “lower” to the “higher” species in the 
animal kingdom, the individuality of the members of those species 
(understood as freedom from the necessitation of nature) intensifies. 
The animal kingdom, therefore, can be thought of as a gradient of 
mounting individuality. “One of the most noteworthy features when 
surveying the steps of the animal ladder is that, from bottom to top, life 
becomes more individual; at the bottom it concentrates on the 
maintenance of the species, and at the top it puts its energies into single 
individuals.”35 
2. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SEXUAL MONOPOLIZATION OF 
INDIVIDUALITY IN “HIGHER” ANIMALS. This principle holds that 
although individuality intensifies as we move up the chain of animal 
being, individuality also gets increasingly monopolized by, or 
centralized in, the male sex of each species. What intensifies in the 
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female sex of the higher species is specific subordination, i.e., the 
domination of the individual female by the species. “Woman, the most 
individualized of females, is also the most fragile, the one who 
experiences her destiny most dramatically and who distinguishes 
herself the most significantly from the male.”36 
3. THE PRINCIPLE OF SEX FUNCTIONALISM. This is the twofold 
idea that (a) species are maintained by the dialectical interplay of two 
metaphysical forces (continuation and rupture)37 and (b) each sex within 
a sexually differentiated species represents one, and only one, of these 
forces. For Beauvoir, the female sex carries the onus of continuation 
(through fertility, pregnancy, and reproduction), while the male sex 
carries the privilege of rupture (through the exercise of freedom and 
autonomy).  
The philosophy of life generated by these principles is, frankly, the least 
persuasive and most confusing aspect of Beauvoir’s reading of biology. It is 
unpersuasive because it grows from uncritical interpretations of gender 
roles in the animal kingdom, with Beauvoir at times describing the 
behaviors of male nonhuman animals (such as beetles) as “assertive” and 
“gratuitous” and those of their female counterparts as “sad” and 
“oppressed.” It is confusing because it recapitulates outmoded scientific 
concepts and distinctions (natural order, “high” vs. “low” animals, etc.) that 
not only seem incompatible with post-nineteenth century biology, but also 
seem to clash with Beauvoir’s own philosophy in both letter and spirit.38 
Even so, Beauvoir leans on this view of life to make a critical observation 
about the interface between nature, existence, and experience—namely, that 
the operations of existence will always exceed the operations of nature and 
cannot be contained by them. Echoing Hume’s famous dictum that no ought 
can ever be derived from an is (“the naturalistic fallacy”), she maintains that 
empirico-natural facts about women’s biology cannot ground or justify 
women’s social positions and situations.  
With this observation, Beauvoir makes a solid case for existential 
phenomenology’s independence from empiricism. And her strategy is 
relatively straightforward: (1) she presents a comprehensive theory of 
nature, (2) she grants that this theory allows for natural differences between 
the sexes, and then (3) she clarifies that even if (1) and (2) hold true, they 
have zero consequences for the theory of existence. Biological facts may 
“enable us to understand woman,” but they cannot “form a fixed destiny for 
her.”39 As Moira Gatens has put it, “[biology] can play a crucial role in 
deciding one’s health, one’s sex, one’s strength, even one’s life span. But it 
does not, and according to Beauvoir cannot, determine how one interprets 
these factors or how they are lived by the free subject.”40 Consequently, any 
biological program that presents “facts” as nature’s Bauplan for the 
elaboration of subjectivity will inevitably surpass its own limits and get 
dangerously close to becoming an ideology.  
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With this observation, moreover, Beauvoir brings questions of female 
embodiment to the core of existentialist philosophy and cautions against the 
masculinist bias of classical phenomenology.41 Since of all living animals, in 
her view, women are the ones that suffer most on account of being 
simultaneously most individualized (qua human) yet also most alienated 
from their individuality (qua female), their relationship to their body is not 
the same as that of their male counterparts.42  Nature makes a phylogenetic, 
ontogenetic, and developmental “claim” on women’s bodies that burdens 
them with the continuation of the species, a claim is often expressed via 
biological processes (the development of breasts during puberty, the onset of 
menstruation, the possibility of pregnancy and lactation, the inevitability of 
menopause) that trap women in a plane of pure immanence. 
Surely, these processes are natural in the sense that they are naturally 
occurring. But, in Beauvoir’s view, women systematically experience them 
not as organic components of the musical flow of lived experience, but as 
acute “crises” that instigate a full-blown war between women and their 
biology. Whereas men experience their biological body as an axis of 
possibility and as the cradle of all their existential projects, women 
experience theirs as the footing of their subjection to the species, as that 
which forestalls their ability to engage in the most important project of all: 
transcendence. Women experience their body as the site of a punishing 
immanence, as “an alienated opaque thing” that suffocates them and 
restricts their ability to assert themselves as free and autonomous agents. 
“Woman is her body as man is his, but her body is something other than 
her,” she says.43 If existentialism and phenomenology want to matter to 
women, Beauvoir seems to be implying, they must take notice of the unique 
logic their embodiment and the biological conundrum that frames it.44 
 
Fourth Stage: The Argument Against Physiology 
While the first three stages of Beauvoir’s argument deal primarily with 
evolutionary theory, the fourth and final stage torques the focus toward 
physiology. Here, Beauvoir puts under the microscope the idea “that 
physiology alone provides answers to [the following] questions: Does 
individual success have the same chances in the two sexes? Which of the two 
in the species plays the greater role?” Physiological research may teach us a 
great deal about the normal functioning of men’s and women’s bodies, but it 
cannot tell us whether a specific sex is “more successful” or “greater”—or 
some other comparative—than its counterpart because the meaning of these 
very concepts (“success” and “significance”) is not exclusively empirical. It 
is also social. And, as social, it is both time- and context-sensitive.      
Beauvoir elaborates this claim through an essentially anthropocentric 
and humanist gesture. She argues that there is a radical break between 
human and nonhuman animals. Humans have the ability to engage in acts 
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of what in Being and Nothingness Sartre calls “negation” or “transcendence” 
through which we lift ourselves above the order of natural necessity. By 
contrast, nonhuman animals are incapable of this critical function and so 
remain confined to the sphere of immanence that effectively demarcates 
empirical science’s domain. Thus, what counts as “success” for nonhuman 
animals falls within the ambit of the empirical (species-typical functioning, 
above-average behavioral outputs). Meanwhile, what counts as “success” 
for humans is correlated with non-empirical acts of transcendence that, 
precisely as non-empirical, escape science’s conceptual reach. For the 
human, what counts as a “task” and what counts as “success” in relation to 
it is always, much like humanity itself, “in the making.”45  
Imagine we want to study whether “the mare is as quick as the stallion, 
[or whether] male chimpanzees do as well on intelligence tests as their 
female counterparts.”46 To find an answer, all we need to do to is phone the 
expert equestrian or the professional primatologist and request the latest 
empirical data on the subject. Surely, ethological observation and behavioral 
experiments can tell us whether on average stallions outrun mares in speed 
competitions and whether also on average male chimps solve mazes and 
puzzles faster than their female counterparts—the question of “success” 
being, in both cases, a purely empirical one since nonhuman animals (male 
or female) can only embark on those projects that are rendered possible by 
their natural bodies and natural functions.47 By contrast, human animals 
engage in acts of transcendence by which we transcend our very animality. 
Hence, an empirical science like physiology may effectively determine 
whether a specific sex is “stronger” or “faster” in a nonhuman species, but it 
cannot make the same determination relative to the human case. From this 
Beauvoir concludes that physiological knowledge “doesn’t apply to women 
and other [non-human] females in the same way.”  
Beauvoir also rejects physiological justifications of masculine 
domination on the grounds that they tend to presuppose a questionable 
principle of “psychophysiological parallelism.” They assume, in simple 
terms, that the quantitative study of normal organic functions can somehow 
define an organism’s psychological capacities and, by extension, existential 
possibilities; that psychological and existential functions (intelligence, 
behavior, success, etc.) can be somehow reduced to quantitative metrics 
(heart rate, brain weight, body mass, etc.). Yet, there are two downsides to 
this reductionist attitude. One is that quantitative measurements are not 
always absolute and unassailable. In fact, they can be misleading depending 
on how scientists approach the object being measured and what variables 
they include in, or exclude from, the act of measurement itself. Another is 
that even when quantitative measurements are conducted in line with 
scientific procedure and can properly be termed “objective”—i.e., even 
when scientists control for variables, take into account margins of error, and 
consider the role that the act of measurement itself plays in “disclosing” the 
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object—they still cannot be said to exhaust the functional potential of their 
object. It is always in principle possible that an object can do more than what 
a sequence of measurements reveal and that its functioning in the future 
may differ from its functioning in the past.  
 Consider the human brain. Sometimes, physiologists study the human 
brain, including its structure, functioning, and composition. And sometimes, 
they do so with the explicit intent of studying gendered differences in 
cognition, including cognitive ability, aptitude, and adaptability. 
Historically, research into the so-called “gendered brain” has been used by a 
wide range of actors and stakeholders, from scientists to policymakers, to 
reinforce women’s oppression and vindicate their collective status as 
second-class citizens.48 If it can be empirically proven that women’s brains 
are on average “smaller” or “weaker” than men’s, or so the argument goes, 
then we have a non-arbitrary basis for characterizing women’s position of 
servitude as “natural” and potentially “obligatory.” In The Second Sex, 
however, Beauvoir works against the naturalization of patriarchy by way of 
physiology49 by observing that the distance between the facts of physiology 
to the norms of patriarchy is larger than those who want to close it in one 
leap imagine. In fact, there are various obstacles that prevent us from 
making this leap at all.  
One of these obstacles is the fact that the “measurements” made by 
scientists are not absolute and enduring truths. They are constructions 
whose logic of generation can be subjected to scrutiny and whose meaning 
depends by and large on the many background assumptions that frame 
them. For example, when physiologists measure “brain size” in order to 
determine whether men and women think differently, a lot hangs on how 
the concept of “size” is interpreted and what variables are used to measure 
it. By “size,” do we mean length, circumference, volume, or weight? And 
once we settle on one of these variables (or on a function involving multiple 
of them), the question remains of how that variable is to be interpreted. 
Suppose we decide to study brain size vis-à-vis brain weight. We still have 
to determine what metric of “weight” will be used. Will we use “absolute 
weight” or “relative weight”? And, if the latter, weight relative to what 
exactly? Relative to body weight, intracranial volume, or something else? 
These questions matter because the results of a scientific investigation—the 
conclusion that can then be mobilized by various stakeholders as a premise 
in the defense of women’s disenfranchisement—depend on the answers we 
give to them. The parameters of the act measurement shape the act itself and 
impact its results.50  
Another obstacle has to do with the interpretation of the “findings” of 
physiological studies. Beauvoir says that even when the professional 
physiologist interested in the interface between brain and gender succeeds at 
laying out a vast number of data points and finding statistically significant 
patterns among them, she still cannot make any legitimate inferences about 
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something like “intelligence” because the relationship between physiological 
variables (e.g. brain size) and psychological functions (e.g. intelligence) is 
not easy to determine. In fact, “no relation has been established between 
brain weight and the development of intelligence.” To reduce the 
psychological to the physiological in this manner is farcical, as farcical as 
attempting to give “a psychic interpretation of the chemical formulas 
defining male and female hormones.”51 Just as a philosopher cannot 
successfully derive an ought from an is, a physiologist cannot successfully 
reduce a quality to a quantity.52 Beauvoir concludes, and with this she brings 
“Biological Data” to a close, that physiologists are incapable of claiming for 
themselves the objects that, properly speaking, belong either to 
psychologists (intelligence, behavior, mental processes) or to philosophers 
(existence, experience, life). Why? Because they (the physiologists, that is) 
cannot give a satisfactory account of the relationship between the 
physiological and the psychological that would permit them to reduce the 
second to the first. “We categorically reject,” she says, “the idea of a 
psychophysiological parallelism; the bases of this doctrine [are] 
philosophically and scientifically ruined, [even if] it still haunts a number of 
minds.”53  
 
The Four Stages Considered as “Immanent Critique” 
If we step back from the different stages of Beauvoir’s commanding reading 
of biology in The Second Sex and focus instead on the trajectory of her 
argument on the whole, we discover important parallels between her 
approach and the method of immanent critique typically associated with the 
Frankfurt school of critical theory.  
In general terms, “immanent critique” refers to a method of critiquing 
an object—be it a theory, a worldview, a situation, a practice, or an 
institution—in light of the object’s own claim to normativity, which is to say, 
in light of the aspirations, values, and commitments of the object itself. With 
academic texts, for example, immanent critique discovers and reveals what 
the German theorist Bernhard Forchtner calls “text-internal 
contradictions,”54 which are tensions internal to the work itself that hint at a 
possible asymmetry between, on the one hand, what the text claims to do 
(its self-understanding) and, on the other, what it actually does (its material 
reality). Of course, immanent critique can never be the simple, mechanical 
application of a master blueprint of “critique.” It must always take its lead 
and energy from the specificity and uniqueness of the object at hand, 
independently of whether this object is a text (a book, a declaration, a 
document, a manifesto, etc.) or something else (a social custom, an economic 
process, a political infrastructure, a legal practice, etc.). In all cases, however, 
the aim of immanent critique is to critically evaluate objects on their own 
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terms by determining whether they measure up to their own norms or 
whether they, in some sense, fall short of them. 55  
In “Biological Data,” Beauvoir employs five “theoretical tactics” that 
bring into heightened relief the affinity between her approach to thinking 
about science and the method of immanent critique. These five tactics enable 
her to interrogate specific biological theories as to whether or not they are in 
good standing relative to the norms, requirements, and strictures of biology 
itself. They allow her to “enter” her object (biology) so as to evaluate it on its 
own normative terms.  
First, Beauvoir exposes gaps in the fabric of biological knowledge that biological 
experts tend to gloss over or repress. Repeatedly, Beauvoir draws our attention 
to scientific inferences that present themselves as logically irrefutable or 
empirically unassailable while relying on premises that have not met the 
right standards of empirical or evidentiary support. One example is the 
physiological theory of gendered cognition described above. This theory 
claims to capture the difference between “male” and “female” intelligence 
by studying differences in brain size. Yet, this theory presupposes a direct 
and probably also causal link between a physiological variable and a 
psychological/existential function. But, again, we have no reason to accept 
this presupposition as true given that “no relation has been established 
between weight and the development of intelligence.”56 What we must take 
notice of here is Beauvoir’s real target. Her first and most significant 
objection to the physiological theory of gendered cognition is neither that 
this theory typecasts women based on their biology and replicates gender 
stereotypes nor that it clashes with Beauvoir’s own social, political, and 
philosophical beliefs. Sure this typecasting and this clash are problems, but 
they come later. The first and main problem with the physiological theory of 
gendered intelligence is more basic but also, for that reason, more 
devastating: the evidence does not bear it out such that it fails to be properly 
“scientific.” (The same is true of the biological theory that reproduction is 
the “penetration” of a passive ovum by an active sperm.)57  
Second, Beauvoir highlights key concepts that appear in biological discourse 
but that, not being themselves strictly speaking biological or even scientific, have to 
power to lead biology astray (i.e., beyond its proper domain) by lading it with all 
sorts of values. Every once in a while, extra-scientific concepts infiltrate 
scientific language and percolate the scientific literature. And while in many 
cases little comes of these concepts (especially when they are only incidental 
aids to scientific explanation and scientific writing), in some instances they 
have the potential to wreck epistemic havoc in science, especially if they 
carry significant extra-scientific baggage. For example, many physiological 
controversies in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries revolved 
around questions of gendered and racial superiority. Is there a race that is 
“the strongest”? Is there a sex that is “the weakest”? To be sure, part of the 
problem with these debates is that they were part and parcel of a larger 
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culture of male and while privilege. Their motivation from the start was to 
answer a question that only this larger culture would have a vested an 
interest in posing. But part of the problem is also that they employed 
concepts that are not, technically speaking, scientific and whose meaning is 
neither clear nor precise (such as the concepts of “strength” and 
“weakness”). What can these concepts possibly mean in a biological context? 
Chances are that concepts like these enter science, in this case physiology, by 
way of common sense and everyday experience. But precisely because of 
their extra-scientific origins, science must either avoid using altogether or 
give a clear defense for their use and a sharp account of their scientific 
meaning. Beauvoir’s point, of course, is not that these concepts can never be 
subjected to systematical and rigorous investigation. It is simply that the sort 
of inquiry needed for their analysis far exceeds the job description of a 
professional biologist.58  
Third, Beauvoir reveals cases of “explanatory cherry-picking” on the part of 
biological theories. The main function of scientific theories is to explain 
phenomena. But because no theory to date has succeeded at unifying all 
observed phenomena under one roof, each theory must content itself with 
explaining a particular slice of the world. Unfortunately, some theories claim 
for themselves more explanatory power than they really possess and, as it 
were, bite more of the empirical world than they can chew. When this 
happens, these theories (or, rather, their defenders) are forced to “cherry-
pick” the phenomena they explain and sometimes to even disregard 
evidence that has the power to falsify them. Throughout “Biological Data,” 
Beauvoir flags instances of this kind of cherry-picking and scorns biological 
theories for artificially inflating the scope of their explanatory reach. A case 
in point is the biological thesis that there are only two sexes in nature, which 
is the subject of most of chapter one. This theory may be a helpful heuristic 
for thinking about many species in the animal kingdom, but all too often it 
overreaches and presents itself as true without qualification (i.e., as 
applicable to the entire animal kingdom in an absolute fashion). Beauvoir 
qualifies this theory precisely by reminding us that the examples rallied by 
its supporters are cherry-picked and that there is a myriad of cases that 
contravene it, such as the existence of hermaphroditic individuals as well as 
the (now experimentally verified) variability of the process of sex-
determination itself.59  
Fourth, Beauvoir shows that scientific conclusions can be refuted from within 
the same standpoint that produces by tweaking the parameters of investigation. In 
scientific contexts, investigative outcomes depend not only on input but also 
on the operationalization parameters that turn input into output. Thus, it is 
very likely that one will obtain different results if one tweaks these 
parameters, say, by changing the variables under investigation or altering 
how these variables are measured, analyzed, and interpreted. Consider the 
physiological theory of intelligence that Beauvoir takes up at the end of the 
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chapter which takes intelligence to be a function of brain size. Even if we 
allow that intelligence is the sort of thing that can be quantified (which is 
contentious), there is still the question of which variable or variables will be 
used to measure it—brain weight, brain volume, brain diameter, or some 
other metric. Now, let us assume we settle on brain weight. We still have to 
specify what we mean by “weight.” If we define weight as “absolute 
average weight,” women are proven to be on average less intelligent than 
men. But if define it as “relative weight” (i.e., weight relative to body size), 
the results flip around and women turn out to be on average smarter than 
men.60 Furthermore, if we define it by yet another metric  (e.g. by dividing 
average weight by .56 of body weight), we get a new and different result. In 
this last case, “equality is the result.”61 This suggests that scientific results 
are products of investigative decisions that, even while occurring under 
settings of feedback-controlled action, involve and reflect a good deal of 
human judgment, including judgments about what gets studied, how it gets 
studied, and why it gets studied in the first place. 
Fifth and finally, Beauvoir spots theories that lend themselves to dubious social 
ends and that continue to have traction in scientific debates solely on account of 
their social utility (i.e., after they have lost their empirical content or predictive 
muscle). Sometimes experts accept scientific theories that merely happen to go 
hand-in-glove with a dominant ideology—racism, sexism, heterosexism, and 
ableism. In these cases, it may be possible to distinguish between the 
epistemic legitimacy of the theories in question and their function as sources 
of social legitimation (although the distinction itself probably should be 
questioned). But sometimes experts accept scientific theories because they go 
hand-in-glove with a given ideology and because they aid and abet in the 
rationalization of social being. In these cases, it is impossible to differentiate 
between a theory’s claim to “legitimacy” and its role as an agent of 
“legitimation” since the only legitimacy such a theory enjoys is the ersatz 
legitimacy afforded to it by its usefulness as an instrument of social 
legitimation. Beauvoir gives two examples of scientific theories that fall 
under this second category and are accepted in spite of there being no real 
evidence for them (or for choosing them over competing theories) and, in 
one case, in spite of there being good evidence against them. One is the 
theory that portrays pregnancy as a “harmonious relationship” between 
mother and fetus. This theory, Beauvoir says, is “obviously useful socially” 
but lacks the rigor, precision, and empirical adequacy of true science.62 The 
other theory is the theory of sex differentiation espoused by Alfred Fouillée 
in his 1895 book Tempérament et caractère selon les individus, les sexes et les 
races, where Fouillée tries to deduce the essence of woman from the nature 
of the ovum and the essence of man from that of sperm. This theory, too, 
possesses vast reserves of social, political, and psychological cachet. Yet,  it 
suffers from a near total lack of scientific substance as it frequently relies on 
“dubious analogies” and “pseudo-thinking [pseudo-pensées].” The first of 
these theories is accepted even though there is no good evidence that 
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supports. The second is accepted even though there is good evidence that 
falsifies it.63  
These five tactics emphasize the varied ways Beauvoir’s thinking links 
up with historical and contemporary debates in the philosophy of science, 
including debates concerning the value-ladenness of science, the 
demarcation between science and pseudo-science, and the influence of socio-
political determinants on the cognitive process.  They also demonstrate the 
proximity between Beauvoir’s approach to the science of biology and the 
method of immanent critique. In my reading, it is theoretically significant 
that Beauvoir never rejects biology as an anti-feminist paradigm or equates 
it with a political ideology. If anything, she repeatedly professes her faith in 
it as an epistemic enterprise. Biology, she says, gives us real knowledge 
about the world, including about the history of the species, the processes 
that govern reproduction, development, and growth, and the myriad 
material, organic, and natural determinants that act upon men and women 
over the course of their natural lives. “Biological data are of extreme 
importance; they play an all important role and are an essential element of 
women’s situation.”64 They “cannot be denied.”65 And even if the meaning 
of biological facts is not for biologists alone to determine, biology itself does 
not lose any of its epistemic status or prestige on that account. It remains a 
legitimate epistemic venture that no self-respecting philosophy can 
offhandedly brush aside. Beauvoir, therefore, accepts the norms that 
according to the scientific community make for good inductive practice (i.e., 
the primacy of observation, the requirement of internal consistency, and the 
importance of empirical adequacy). She simply uses these norms to evaluate 
the observational and theoretical claims of the biology of her time. 66  Thus, 
while her tone in this chapter is decidedly “critical,” she is not “critiquing” 
biology in the sense of de-legitimizing it. She is “critiquing” it in the sense of 
holding it accountable to itself, which is to say, in the sense of immanent 
critique. The conclusion I draw from this is that the endgame of The Second 
Sex is not a ruthless “unmasking” of biology as ideology, but a critical and 
clever engagement with biological reason that acknowledges the value of 
biological knowledge while recognizing that this knowledge has the 
potential to become ideological in particular instances.  
If there is anything this work successfully “unmasks,” it is what I call 
biology’s hubristic impulse (from the Greek ὕ βρις, meaning arrogance or 
excessive pride), which is its tendency to become overly confident of itself—
always, of course, to its own ruin. By the end of the opening chapter on 
biology, Beauvoir’s message to biology is really quite simple: “do not stray 
too far from your island of true (i.e. corroborated) knowledge for otherwise 
you risk becoming fallacious and ideological.” For her, scientific programs 
falls from epistemic grace when they refuse to accept their limits, gaps, and 
ambiguities; when they become so attached to specific interpretations of 
phenomena that they cannot change, evolve, or adapt in light of new 
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evidence, new circumstances, or new situations; when they apply concepts 
outside their proper domain or claims for themselves concepts that their 
own formal and empirical methods are unable to accommodate. A scientific 
domain becomes ideological when, in a flagrant display of hubristic 
arrogance, it fails to abide by its own principles and rules. In these cases, a 
domain that might otherwise have a good claim to epistemic legitimacy 
becomes epistemologically dubious. It ceases living in the element of truth 
and authenticity, and slips into its very own form of epistemic “bad faith.” 
 
Uncharted Depths: Science Beyond “Biological Data” and 
The Second Sex  
By hanging a lantern on Beauvoir’s multi-layered reading of biology in The 
Second Sex, I have sought to bring to light the scientific face of her 
philosophy and accentuate what Moira Gatens calls “the continuing 
relevance of [her] philosophy for present-day readers,”67 especially for those 
interested in science, existentialism, and feminism.68At the same time, I have 
sought to use Beauvoir’s engagement with biology to deflate the popular 
conception that existentialist philosophy is by design “anti-science,” which 
has become popular in some philosophical circles.69 This conception is 
dangerous because it hampers our critical imagination and prevents us from 
recognizing the profound historical and conceptual links that exist (or could 
exist) between science and existentialism., and because it keeps us from 
building intellectual coalitions that deepen (or could deepen) our 
understanding of both the existential dimensions of scientific practice and 
the scientific dimensions of human existence. It is also dangerous because it 
is a self-fulfilling prophecy. It contributes to the scarcity of research by 
which, in turn, it justifies itself. If there are no links between existentialism 
and science, there must be no need to do research on the subject. And if 
there is no research, it must be because there is no link. My analysis,, 
however, suggests that Beauvoir’s chapter on “Biological Data” ruptures this 
circular reasoning by giving us a concrete snapshot of what a mutually 
enriching dialogue between existentialism and science looks like.  
But here a caveat must be introduced: my reading is not without its 
flaws and limitations. My reading, for instance, focuses entirely on 
Beauvoir’s reading of biology, leaving her readings of experimental 
medicine,70 sociology,71 and anthropology72 essentially untouched. Of 
course, the decision to privilege biology is not entirely arbitrary since the 
chapter on biology is the place where Beauvoir’s scientific and 
epistemological interests assert themselves most uncompromisingly and 
with indisputable force. Still, this decision is a decision that, like the 
decisions scientists make on a daily basis, involves value-laden judgments 
and the possibility of human error. My reading, furthermore, is limited to 
The Second Sex. A more comprehensive account of Beauvoir’s relationship to 
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positive science would have to go beyond this text. Such an account would 
have to delve into Beauvoir’s early education and study in unremitting 
fashion the many scientific texts, figures, and problems that captured her 
imagination as a student. It would have to trace the evolution of her 
thinking about science over the course of her entire career from Memoirs of a 
Dutiful Daughter (1958) to All Said and Done (1972), passing through The 
Prime of Life (1960) and The Force of Circumstance (1963) along the way. Such 
an account would also have to explore how her interests in science and 
epistemology came to manifest themselves both throughout The Second Sex 
(not just in its opening chapter) and in works other than The Second Sex (such 
as The Ethics of Ambiguity [1947] and her many works of literature). Finally, a 
truly comprehensive reading would need to tackle the enormously complex 
issue of “intellectual influence” and tease apart Beauvoir’s relationship to 
scientific thinkers as varied as Leon Brunschvicg73 Gaston Bachelard,74 Henri 
Bergson,75 and Jean Piaget,76 among others. But since reaching this level of 
completeness is beyond the scope of the present piece, I have no choice but 
to leave the task of exploring these uncharted depths of the Beauvoirian 
undertaking to other scholars.  
But just as this reading is not without its shortcomings, it is also not 
without its returns. To start with, my reading helps us recognize that there 
are substantial epistemological questions at stake in Beauvoir’s work and 
that there are parallels to be drawn between her philosophy and various 
“schools of thought” with which it her work not typically associated, 
especially the philosophy of science. More importantly perhaps, my reading 
also helps us overcome one of the central problems in the Beauvoir studies 
literature, which is the problem of how to read The Second Sex as a whole in 
light of it apparent internal disunion.  
Allow me to explain this point in more detail. The Second Sex is divided into 
two volumes: volume I “Facts and Myths” and volume II “Lived 
Experience.” Volume I deals with various theoretical discourses (such as 
biology, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and history) using a method of critical 
analysis. Meanwhile, volume II deals with women’s experiences of 
alienation over the course of their lives (from childhood to puberty to sexual 
initiation and beyond) using a method of radical phenomenological 
description. It has been claimed that since these volumes have different 
objects and methods, there is a tension between them that splits The Second 
Sex in half. How do these volumes relate to one another? Why do they 
cohabitate under one roof?  Typically, this question has been resolved by 
presenting the objects discussed in volume I (including biology) as “part[s] 
of the theoretical framework of patriarchy,” i.e., as social forces that 
contribute to the alienation of women discussed in volume II.77 On this view, 
however, the only link between the objects of volume I and the object of 
volume II is that the former shape the latter by constructing ideological 
edifices that have an alienating effect on women’s experience of the world.78  
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I find this view deficient, or at least incomplete. Volume I is not only 
about scientific myths. As its own title indicates, it is also about facts. It is 
about facts that, in Beauvoir’s own words, “cannot be denied.” Hence, it is 
not only the myths perpetrated by biology (e.g., the myth of pregnancy as a 
perfect harmony between mother and fetus) but also the facts discovered by 
it (including genetic, chemical, and evolutionary facts) that shape women’s 
experience of the world. This is why, for instance, Beauvoir observes in the 
final pages of “Biological Data” that as long as classical phenomenology 
remains ignorant of the facts of women’s biology, it cannot hope to 
understand the logic of women’s embodiment. This is also why the events 
that appear in volume I as “biological crises” (the development of the 
breasts during puberty, menstruation, pregnancy, menopause) re-appear in 
volume II as “moments of existential alienation”—because, under Beauvoir’s 
philosophy, women’s experience depends not only on the social dimensions 
in which biological facts acquire meaning but also on the biological facts 
themselves. The content and concerns of volume I, therefore, are not extrinsic 
to the content and concerns of volume II but integral to them. And this is 
precisely what my reading enables us to see—namely, that a 
phenomenology of the second sex (i.e. volume I), insofar as it is the 
phenomenology of a sex with a unique biology, has no choice but to 
commence from the data of biology, which is to say, from the biology of the 
second sex. 
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